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A PROBLEM IN ETHICS
Of all the pseudo-humorists who annoy law students, the
most obnoxious is the one who asks if a lawyer is really justified in defending a man whom he knows to be guilty of the crime
charged against him. Such an inquisitor can not be dismissed
with a stifled yawn or an inane remark, as can other less subtle
wits; he must be accorded all the deference due a sane questioner. This poor fellow is the most dangerous of all the wits,
for he insists on being taken seriously; if he is refused an answer
he will understand there is none. He is a philosopher, and
must receive a philosophic reply. He is intensely moral, and
to wave away his question with a careless gesture is to admit
that lawyers are immoral. Therefore, to save the imputation,
some kind of a reply is necessary-for even a pseudo-humorist
has friends and followers, and some might listen to his story
of how he "baffled" a law student.
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At the outset, it should be borne in mind that the word
"guilt" has a double meaning; there exists guilt both in law
and in morals. With moral guilt we are not concerned; God
alone is the judge of that, and God needs no finite evidence to
aid him in discovering the truth. The lawyer is not trying to
tell the Almighty that a man morally guilty is innocent. What
he is attempting to do is to- argue that his client is not legally
guilty. And of legal guilt the state alone is the judge; the state
has specified certain facts which must be proved before it will
adjudge a man guilty of the crime charged against him. The
state has declared quite emphatically what constitutes guilt, and
has just as emphatically asserted that a man is innocent until he
has been conclusively proven guilty. And the only judges of
an accused criminal are the court and jury; the lawyer has never
been given the right to say whether his own client deserves
punishment. An attorney may even be absolutely convinced
that the man before him is stained with a dead man's blood, but
still he is not empowered to deny him the privileges guaranteed
by the government.
In his treatise on Legal Ethics, Warvelle sets forth this
interesting case. Two brothers, by name Boorn, were arrested
in Vermont and charged with the murder of one Colvin. The
evidence against them was indisputable; the defendants had
been known to have threatened the life of the deceased, and they
had actually been.engaged in violent personal combat on the day
of the crime. Indeed, the prisoners even confessed to the murder. They admitted that they had brutally attacked Colvin,
and had left him lying on the field where bones "not dissimilar"
to his were found. The result of the confession was inevitable;
the brothers Boorn were convicted and sentenced to death. Before the execution, however, it was discovered that the man Colvin was still alive-he had merely been knocked unconscious
by his attackers, and after their flight had 'ianaged to stumble
away. . . If in this case, the lawyers defending the Boornb
had refused to undertake their task, the prisoners would never
have had a chance.
So a lawyer can never be certain that his client is guiltyeven after a confession. The prisoner might believe that he
is a criminal, and that he merits punishment, but he might still

